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Is Gun Control Likely To Reduce
Violent Killings?
Frank Zimring
One of the major arguments for the elimination of firearms, and deriva-
tively for gun control laws, is that such measures would reduce the
number of criminal homicides.1 It has been argued, however, that
eliminating guns would have no such effect because if somebody wants
to kill, he will find a weapon to achieve "his destructive goal"; there is,
it is said, more than one way to skin a cat.2 This paper is an attempt to
bring this phase of the gun control debate closer to a resolution,
through analysis of data from the Police Department of the City of
Chicago on reported criminal homicides and serious, but not fatal,
criminal assaults during 1965, 1966, and 1967.
HoMICIDE AND THE INTENTION To KILL
If all homicides resulted from such a single-minded intention to kill
as gangland killings, laws prohibiting firearms would not have a substan-
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1 "It would be fairly easy to reduce the number of murders. Rational and effective
laws would cut homicide sharply." Norval Morris, quoted in Loox, Sept. 19, 1967, at 32.
2 "More than the availability of a shooting weapon is involved in homicide. Pistols
and revolvers are not difficult to purchase ... in Philadelphia .... The type of weapon
used appears to be, in part, the culmination of assault intentions or events and is only
superficially related to causality. To measure quantitatively the effect of the presence of
firearms on the homicide rate would require knowing the number and type of homicides
that would not have occurred had not the offender-or, in some cases, the victim-
possessed a gun. Research would require determination of the number of shootings that
would have been stabbings, beatings, or some other method of inflicting death had no
gun been available. It is the contention of this observer that few homicides due to
shootings could be avoided merely if a firearm were not immediately present, and that
the offender would select some other weapon to achieve the same destructive goal. Prob-
ably only in those cases where a felon kills a police officer, or vice versa, would homicide
be avoided in the absence of a firearm." M. WOLFGANG, PATrENs iN CRIMINAL HoMIcmE
82-83 (1958).
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tial effect on homicide. Even assuming such assassins would be unable to
obtain guns-a doubtful supposition-they would resort to other weap-
ons on the order of dynamite to achieve their intention. But not all hom-
icides are so unambiguously motivated. The question is: Do a significant
proportion of homicides result from a less deliberate and determined
intention? If this question may be answered in the affirmative, and if
the probable substitute for firearms in these situations is less likely to
lead to death, then the elimination of guns would reduce the number of
homicides.
The hypothesis is more easily stated than proved. For obvious reasons,
there are no precise data on the intention of an attacker toward his vic-
tim-whether he wished to wound or injure, with some apprehension
of the risk of death or some desire to kill, or whether he single-mindedly
intended to kill at any cost. Either of these mental states would be con-
sistent with a finding of murder if homicide results. But the more am-
biguous intention might well lead to the termination of an attack before
lethal consequences ensue. The barroom fight ends when one of the two
participants has been stabbed, shot, or beaten into submission." At that
point the issue has been decided. Similarly, the violent domestic dispute
may end decisively without fatal consequences.
A series of statistics for the city of Chicago throws light on the degree
to which homicides result from an ambiguous, rather than a single-
minded, intention to kill. The first table corncerns the relationship
between attacker and victim in homicide cases:
TABLE I
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMICIDE VICTIM AND ATrAcKER: CHICAGO, 1967
Relationship %
Friends and acquaintances 41
Spouse or lover 20
Other family 7
Neighbors 3
Business 3
No relationship 22
Undetermined 4
Total TWO
Number of cases 554
More than two-thirds of all killings involved spouses, lovers,
friends, or tavern guests as victim and attacker.
Closely related to data on relationship are statistics about the motive
of the attack:
3 For statistics on non-fatal serious assaults, see Tables 7, 8, and 9 infra. See also
WOLrGANG, supra note 2, at 86, for a discussion of the quality of intention in homicides
by beating in Philadelphia.
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TABLE 2
MOTIVES OF HoMIacmE AS E rABLISHED BY POLICE: CHICAGO, 1967
Motives
Altercations:
General Domestic 17
Money 9
Liquor 7
Sex 2
Triangle 6
Racial 1
Children 2
Other 38
82
Teen Gang Disputes: 3
Robbery:
Strong Arm 3
Armed 9
Other Motive: 3
Total 100
Number of cases 551
82% of the homicides in Chicago in 1967 occurred as a result of
altercations-domestic, money, liquor, etc.-precisely the situa-
tions where the intention is more apt to be ambiguous rather than
single-minded.
Third, a comparison of victims of homicide with victims of serious
assaults, with respect to their race and sex, shows:
Victims of homicides and victims of serious assaults are distrib-
uted quite similarly by race and sex among the population and
differ substantially in these characteristics from the Chicago popu-
lation as a whole. (See Table 3.)
Next, it should be noted that only 30% of the victims of fatal gun-
shot attacks in 1967 were wounded by more than one shot. While data
are not available on the number of shots fired, it may be readily as-
sumed that the majority of the 70% of single wound homicides occur-
red in situations where the attacker did not exhaust the multiple shot
capacity of his firearm.4
Finally, in 54% of the situations which led to homicide in 1967, the
police noted that the offender or the victim or both had been drinking
prior to the homicidal attack. This figure probably does not include a
number of situations in which the police officer was unable to deter-
mine whether intoxicants were involved.
4 When one offender kills more than one victim, this inference may not hold. Nine
cases where the police noted the weapon was exhausted were found in the 1967 records.
More may have gone without notation.
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TABLE 3
HoMIcIDE AND SERIOUS ASSAULT VICTIMS AND CHICAGO POPULATION BY RACE AND SEX
Serious Assault
Homicide Victims of Gun Chicago
Victims and Knife Attacks Population
1967 5th Period, 1968 19601
White
Male 15 1 37
Female 7 4 39
Negro
Male 59 61 11
Female 12 15 12
Other
Male 6 5 -2
Female 1 1 9
Total 100% 100% 100%
Number 553 480 3,540,100
1 More recent data on Chicago population by both race and sex are not available. Non-
whites are estimated to have comprised 30% of the city's population in April 1968, as
compared with 24% in 1960. Hospital Planning Council for Metropolitan Chicago, Chi-
cago Regional Hospital Study: Population Estimates for Municipalities and Counties
in the Chicago Consolidated Area, 1967 and 1968, Table 2 (mimeo. July 1968).
2 Less than 0.5%.
It may be inferred from these data that many homicides are related to
variable states of intention and that a significant proportion do not re-
sult from an attack committed with the single-minded intention to kill.
The next question that must be asked in order to determine whether
elimination of firearms would result in a lower homicide rate, is
whether firearms as a class are more dangerous in the normal assault
situation than the most dangerous probable substitute weapon. If they
are not, then their elimination would not reduce the homicide rate,
which is a function of the dangerousness of the weapons used multi-
plied by the number of serious attacks. Before an answer may be sought
from the data, it is necessary to define "dangerousness" of a weapon in
a manner that permits empirical study.
DEFINING DANGEROUSNESS
To say that weapon A is more dangerous than weapon B might mean
either that weapon A can facilitate the implementation of intentions to
attack in situations where weapon B cannot, or that consummated at-
tacks with weapon A are more dangerous than consummated attacks
with weapon B, or both. Certainly, the capacity of a particular weapon
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to make a homicidal attack possible-its range-is an element of any
definition of weapon dangerousness. 5 But no available experience statis-
tics indicate how many attacks with weapon A would not have been at-
tacks at all if weapon B and not weapon A were available.
We do know (1) that firearms as a class have a greater range for carry-
ing intention into act than any other frequently used assault mechanism,
and (2) that most homicides involve individuals who are acquainted with
one another and take place in "inside" locations such as homes, taverns,
and common passageways." The prior acquaintance of victim and of-
fender and the location of most homicidal attacks suggest that it is cor-
rect to assume that weapon range is a critical factor in attack situations
in only a comparatively small number of cases.7 Nonetheless, to the lim-
ited extent that range has any bearing on the dangerousness of weapons
in attack, guns must be considered more dangerous than alternative
weapons in common usage. Where range is important, as in the killing
of police, the absence of firearms may have preventive effects beyond the
scope of this study.
The Most Dangerous Probable Substitute Weapon
In order to assess the impact of effective gun control on homicide
fairly, the dangerousness of firearms in attack situations should be
judged against the dangerousness of the most dangerous weapon which
probably would be-as opposed to could be-used in assault situations
were firearms not available.
There are a number of dangerous instrumentalities widely available
to most of the population. Knives, other cutting instruments, automo-
biles, and blunt instruments of all kinds are freely available. Hands and
feet, potentially lethal instruments in their own right, are a part of
man's standard equipment. Some, but not all, poisons are available in
various forms. Many flammable and explosive substances are within the
average citizen's reach. Thus, weapon availability is a threshold which
excludes only a few of the more exotic or technically sophisticated
means of destruction. A far more important screening question is
whether a particular form of attack instrumentality is available in the
perceptual sense-likely to enter the thoughts and physical reach of an
individual who is contemplating attack.
5 Range is of particular importance in political killings and in killing armed indi-
viduals. Thus, factors affecting range would concededly affect the rate of police officers
killed. See WOLFGANG, supra note 2, at 83.
6 In 1967, over 2/3 of Chicago homicides took place in inside locations. See also Ho-,I-
CIDE SECTION, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT SECTION, Rnvsw UNrr, CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T., MURDER
ANALYsIs-1966. For statistics on relationship, see Table I supra.
7 See WOLrGANG, supra note 2, at 83.
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A rough estimate of the perceived availability of instrumentalities as
murder weapons can be obtained by analyzing the type of weapons
actually used in homicides reported to the police:
Homicide by Weapon: Chicago, 19668
Firearms 52
Knives 30
Other weapons 8
No weapon 10
Not known 1
100%
Total number: 510
It is true, of course, that some attack instruments may be underre-
ported because it is difficult to discover that they have caused a death
(e.g., some forms of poison) or because death caused by the instrumen-
tality is not normally suspected as intentionally caused whether or not
intention was actually present (e.g., automobiles). Poison is not even
listed as a cause of death in Chicago homicide in 1966. An automobile is
listed as accounting for one suspected intentional death. The great
disproportion between knife and bodily attacks and other instrumen-
talities does not allow for the serious competition of automobiles and
poison.
Thus, unless the people who make homicidal attacks with firearms are
radically different from those who make homicidal attacks with other
weapons known to the police, the absence of guns would produce a
great many more knife attacks and a substantially greater number of
attacks using hands or feet as potentially homicidal weapons.
There are two -separate kinds of evidence suggesting that guns and
knives are used by the same sorts of people:
As table 4 shows, in general, the same kinds of altercations pro-
duce gun and knife killings.
As table 5 shows, firearms and knives are used by whites and Ne-
groes in about the same proportions.
Although knives result in three times as many homicides as attacks
with the hands or feet, it is not necessarily true that knife attacks are
more physically dangerous than all kinds of attacks with hands or feet.
Some forms of attack involving the hands or feet, such as strangulation,
might conceivably result in death in a greater proportion of attacks in
earnest than some forms of knife attack. But comparison of the propor-
8 MURDER ANALYso--1966, supra note 6. 1967 homicides by weapon show the same
pattern: guns 57%, knives 25%, hands or feet 10%, other 8%, total number 553.
[Vol. 35:721
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TABLE 4
POLICE-NOMINATED MOTIVE OF HOMICIDES BY WEAPON: CHICAGO, 1966
Shot Stabbed Other
Altercations:
General Domestic 21 25 23
Money 6 7 2
Liquor 2 8 4
Sex 1 3 2
Gambling 2 1 0
Triangle 5 5 3
Theft (alleged) -- 2
Children 2 1 1
Other 41 30 28
80 80 65
Robbery:
Strong Arm - - 10
Armed 9 9 4
Burglary: - -
Sex:
Perversion 2 3 5
Assault of Woman - 4 7
Wanton Use of Weapons: 2 - 1
Undetermined: 6 4 4
Gangland Type:
Organized 1 - -
Crim. of Victim
Burglar - -
Undetermined -- I
Other:
Mercy Killing - 1
Mental Disorder - - 2
100% 100% 100%
Number 265 152 93
TABLE 5
HO ICrE WEAPON UsED BY RACE AND SEX OF OFFENDER CHICAGO, 1967
Male Female
Negro White Negro White
Guns 60 59 40 50
Knives 21 16 54 33
No weapon 12 17 1 0
Other 8 8 4 17
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of
Offenders 330 71 72 12
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tions of killings does indicate one of two things: (1) if attacks using the
hands or feet are very much more common than the homicide statistics
indicate, they are physically very much less dangerous than knife at-
tacks, or (2) if attacks using the hands or feet are physically more dan-
gerous than knife attacks, they are very much less used and therefore
less available in the perceptual sense.
Strangulation is very rare in Chicago. There were six such reported
fatalities in 1966: most homicides by hand or foot attack were attribut-
able to beatings. Since beatings are common in attack situations, it is
more probable that knives are physically more dangerous. In either case,
since we are talking about the predominant probable substitute for gun
attacks, the balance would seem to favor the use of knife attacks. The
use of beatings would lead to even stronger differences than those noted.
FATALITY RATES FROM GUN AND KNiFE ATTACKS
Chicago police records include data which permit useful comparison
between serious knife and gun attacks and between knife and gun kill-
ings. (See Table 6.) For 1967, these data show:
2.3 times as many serious knife attacks were reported to the
police as gun attacks.
Knives accounted for less than half the number of homicides
that guns did.
The rate of knife deaths per 100 reported knife attacks was
less than 1/5 the rate of gun deaths per 100 reported gun at-
tacks.
These figures support the inference that if knives were substituted for
guns, the homicide rate would drop significantly.
TABLE 6
NUMBER OF NON-FATAL ATTACKS AND HOMICIDES WITH KNIVES AND FIREARMas RECORDED BY
PoLica: CHICAGO, 1965-67
Non-Fatal
Attacks Homicides
1965
Knives 5,285 104
Firearms 1,298 195
1966
Knives 5,230 152
Firearms 1,873 265
1967
Knives 5,612 135
Firearms 2,412 317
Total
Knives 16,127 391
Firearms 5,583 777
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The figures, though not the inference, are subject to qualification,
however. Not all gun or knife attacks are called to the attention of the
police. That attacks reported to the police are not a complete census of
weapon attacks in the population would not, by itself, disturb the va-
lidity of inferences made from comparisons of police statistics. But if a
plausible argument can be made that the police statistics are not a reli-
able index of attack rates in the total population, and if the factors
which undermine the use of police statistics as an index could be ex-
pected to overstate the proportion of knife relative to gun attacks re-
ported, the validity of inferences from police attack statistics could be
questioned.
Two plausible reasons why attacks with one weapon could be more
often reported than attacks using a second weapon may be noted. First,
the more serious a victim perceives an attack to be, the more likely it is
that he will report the attack to the police. Attacks with weapons which
are considered more serious will be reported to the police proportion-
ately more often than weapons considered less serious. It must be stated
that we do not here deal with the fine distinctions that people may make
regarding the lethal potential of various weapons. Thus, if individuals
considered both knife and gun attacks to be very serious, the marginal
differences in their opinions regarding the two weapons could not be
expected to produce significant reporting differentials. Second, to the
extent that aggressive patrol, investigation, police pressure on victims to
promote disclosure, or a patrolman's decision to report an attack may
affect police records, the police perception of weapon dangerousness will
influence the proportional relationships found in police statistics. A se-
ries of interviews of Chicago police officials at various levels indicates
that the unanimous feeling of concerned police officers is that gunshot
attacks are more dangerous than knife attacks. To the extent that police
and victim perceptions distort police statistics, therefore, they appar-
ently result in underestimation rather than overestimation of the ratio
of knife attacks to gun attacks in Chicago.
To rebut the inference that substituting knife attacks for gun attacks
would reduce the homicide rate, it can also be argued that because a
knife is viewed as a less serious weapon than a gun, a lower proportion
of knife attacks represent attacks in earnest. The statistics darify the
form such an argument would have to take. First, it can be noted that
the use of attacks reported to the police as a standard to construct attack
proportions has already screened out a certain number of attacks which
are not considered terribly serious, because it is plausible that attacks
perceived of as being more serious are more often reported. Second, in
order to equalize the number of deaths per 100 attacks in earnest with
each weapon, the "non-earnest knife attack" hypothesis must explain
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over 75% of the total number of reported knife assaults even if it is
assumed that every firearm attack reported to the police in 1966 repre-
sents an attack in earnest. To the extent that less than all firearm attacks
are considered in earnest, an even greater proportion of knife attacks
must be discounted. On its face, this seems implausible. The demo-
graphic similarity between knife attack victims and homicide victims is
an additional indication that the two statistics may be two products of
dosely similar forms of attack, in essence a continuum rather than two
discrete behaviors. Given the magnitude of the difference between re-
ported knife and gun assaults, and the substantial probability that re-
porting biases underestimate the proportional impact of knife assaults if
they have any influence at all, the non-earnest hypothesis seems an in-
complete explanation of the different assault/killing ratios noted in
Chicago.
THE ATTACK STUDY
To obtain a more accurate impression of the character of knife and
firearm attacks reflected in Chicago police records, police assault records
for the period November 9-December 6, 1967 were analyzed in detail.
The ratio of knife attacks to gun attacks was somewhat lower during this
period than in any of the larger periods which have been the basic focus
of analysis. Still, the number of knife attacks was substantially greater
than the number of firearm attacks. And the ratio of gun killings to
knife killings rose even more dramatically in this period than the ratio
of gun attacks to knife attacks. There were 34 deaths attributable to
firearms during this police period and eight deaths attributable to stab-
bings. The rate of knife deaths per 100 reported knife assaults was less
than one-sixth of the rate of gun deaths per 100 reported gun assaults
during this police period. This relationship is consistent with the over-
all one to five statistic found in the earlier large period comparisons.
One way of estimating the seriousness of an attack is to determine
where the attacker sought to wound his victim. It may be assumed that
actual wound location is a generally reliable indicator of the intended
target, particularly for knives. It is highly unlikely that a great number
of individuals intending superficial wounds to a non-vital area of the
victim's body would by mistake stab him in the back, chest, neck or ab-
domen. Indeed, to the extent that "mistakes" produce a patterned dif-
ference between intended and actual location of wounds, the bias would
probably understate rather than overstate the seriousness of a large
group of attacks.
Table 7 sets forth the most serious area of the body where a wound
was sustained in a knife or gun attack. It shows:
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70 knife wounds per 100 knife attacks occurred in areas that
are associated with serious attacks-chest, abdomen, head and
face, back, and neck-while only 56 gunshot wounds per 100
firearm attacks occurred in these areas.
Knife attacks resulting in wounds to non-vital areas-thighs
and extremities-occurred no more frequently per 100 attacks
than similar gun wounds. A smaller number of knife wounds
to legs and thighs per 100 attacks is balanced against a larger
number of knife wounds to arms, hands, and wrists per 100
attacks. Of every 100 reported firearm attacks, 12 resulted in
no wound, while there was only one reported knife attack dur-
ing the period which resulted in no wound.
TABLE 7
FATAL KNIFE AND GUN ATrACKS By LOCATION OF
CHICAGO, NOVaMBER 9-DEcaamBER 6, 1967
MOST SMUous WOUND:
Non-Fatal Fatal
Location Attacks Attacks Total
of most
serious Knife Gun Knife Gun Knife Gun
wound % % % % % %
Serious
Chest 15 13 50 44 15 17
Abdomen 17 12 - 18 17 13
Head 15 11 38 32 16 14
Back 10 3 13 3 10 3
Neck 4 1 - - 4 1
Shoulders 8 8 - 3 8 7
Total 69 48 100 100 70 56
Non-Serious
Legs 7 28 - - 7 24
Arms 24 10 - - 23 9
Missed - 14 - - - 12
Total 31 52 - - 30 45
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number 358 213 8 34 366 247
These data appear to support three inferences, each of which will be
discussed in turn.
1. Not all gun attacks can be per se considered attacks in earnest.
About 56% of the reported firearm attacks, including all of the fatal
attacks noted during the sample police period, produced wounds in the
chest, abdomen, head area, and the back and shoulders. It is, of course,
true that many of the gun wounds in locations like the back or chest
were not the kinds of wounds which led to fatalities. However, since we
are using wound location as an index of the intended seriousness of an
NON-FATAL AND
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attack, and wound seriousness is an indication of outcome rather than
intention, it is probably safe to assume that a substantial proportion of
those gun attacks with dangerous area wounds could qualify as attacks
in earnest, since they generated the risk of fatal consequences.
It can be argued, however, that since the relationship between the
intended locale of an attack and the actual locale of the wounding is not
complete, many of the firearm attacks that have been coded as misses, or
attacks culminating in a wound no more serious than an arm, hand, hip,
leg, or foot wound, were actually much more seriously intended. A pro-
ponent of this position would point out that when a police report indi-
cates that a man firing a gunshot has missed, as it does in a substantial
number of cases, there is no information on what area of the body the
gunshot wound has missed, and therefore no inference may be drawn
about the seriousness of the attack. The normal attack capacity of a fire-
arm, however, is substantially more than one shot. If an individual does
not wound a victim as seriously as he intended on the first try, he may
try again. Since Table 7 only codes wounds by location of the most se-
rious wound area of a particular attack, attacks coded in less serious
areas are attacks in which the assailant did not try again, or at least had
no greater success. If attacks resulting in multiple wounds are presump-
tively considered serious and added to those resulting in actual wounds
to serious areas, the total is less than 58% of all gun attacks. (See Table
8.) Adding shotgun attacks not already included still leaves the total at
roughly 60%. It is doubtful, therefore, that all gun attacks are accompa-
nied by even ambiguous intentions to kill.
2. A substantial proportion of the knife attacks reported to police
appear to be attacks in earnest. The data show that a far greater number
of knife attacks resulted in wounds to serious than to non-serious loca-
tions. If the 29 multiple knife wounds in non-serious locations are added
to the knife wounds in serious areas, the total is approximately 77%.
(See Table 8.) While it is doubtless true that not all attacks resulting in
serious area wounds were in earnest, it may also be presumed that some
of the attacks resulting in non-serious wounds to the arms represent at-
tacks in earnest partially thwarted by the victim's defensive use of his
arms. In any event, it is difficult to argue that only an insignificant pro-
portion of knife attacks are made in earnest.
3. There is no evidence that attacks in earnest are much more com-
mon with guns than with knives. Adding multiple wounds in non-seri-
ous locations to all serious wound locations makes possible a very rough
estimate of the proportion of attacks which are in earnest for guns and
knives. As indicated above, these figures are approximately 60% and
77%, respectively. Obviously, these are only rough estimates. Their
[Vol. 35:721
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TABLE 8
KNIFE AND GUN ATTACKs RESULTING IN MULTIPLE WOUNDS:
CHICAGO, NovEMBER 9-DECEMBER 6, 1967
Knife Gunl
Serious Area
Number of Multiple Wound Attacks 117 19
Non-Fatal Attacks 46% 16%
Fatal Attacks 50% 19%
Non-Serious Area
Number of Multiple Wound Attacks 29 5
Non-Fatal Attacks 26% 5%
Fatal Attacks --
1 Does not include shotgun attacks resulting in multiple, non-serious area wounds.
trend, however, may be usefully compared with police estimates of the
gravity of the most serious wound sustained by the victim. Since the
gravity of the wound may reflect a number of factors independent of
the attacker's intention, the use of these police data should be secondary,
to safeguard against any unwarranted inferences from the wound loca-
tion data.
The police classify knife wounds as "slash" and "puncture" wounds.
Slash wounds involve a shallower penetration than puncture wounds.
Some gun wounds are classified by the police as "grazing," less serious
wounds. The police estimates (see Table 9) indicate:
34% of the serious area knife wounds were slash wounds;
25% involved only one serious area slash wound. If this latter
group is excluded, 59% of the knife attacks resulted in punc-
ture wounds to serious areas or multiple knife wounds.
9% of the serious area firearm wounds were grazings. Ex-
cluding these leaves 56% of all firearm attacks resulting in se-
rious area or multiple gunshot or shotgun wounds.
Excluding slash and graze wounds from attacks in earnest is not neces-
sarily the best method of arriving at final figures. While slash and graze
wounds where there was only one serious area wound may have resulted
from less ominous attack intentions than penetrating wounds, the dan-
gerousness of the area where the wound was sustained militates against
this interpretation. Nevertheless, the exclusion results in a conservative
estimate of the proportions of knife and gun attacks which are in earnest.
These statistics support two complementary propositions: (1) a
roughly equal proportion of knife and gun attacks are of the kind which
may not have been attacks in earnest, and (2) a roughly equal proportion
of police reported knife and gun attacks are of the kind that suggest the
1968]
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TABLE 9
POLICE-NOTED ExTENT OF WOUND BY WEAPON AND AREA OF WOUND: NON-FATAL ATTACKS,
CHiCAco, NOVEMBER 9-DECEMBER 6, 1967
Serious Area
Knifel Gun2
Puncture 66 Wound 92
Slash 34 Graze 9
100% 100%
Number of Cases 247 106
Non-Serious Area
Knife Gun
Puncture 70 Wound 99
Slash s0 Graze 1
100% 100%
Number of Cases 110 81
1 Does not include one "menaced."
2 Does not include 29 "missed."
attack was probably seriously intended. If the area of wounding is taken
as an index of seriousness, a greater number of knife wounds than gun
wounds are presumptively in earnest, and a lesser number of knife
wounds than gun wounds are of the kind where the location of the
attack creates some doubt about the earnestness of the attack. If the
presence or absence of multiple shooting or stabbing is examined,
nothing about the data suggests that the average knife attack is any less
seriously intended than the average gun attack. Indeed, multiple knife
attacks are more common per 100 reported attacks than multiple gun
attacks. Finally, if all single knife slash wounds are removed from the
class of presumptively serious attacks, this still leaves roughly equal
proportions of presumptively serious attacks, with the gun figure slightly
higher than the knife figure. If all single and multiple knife slash
wounds are removed from the class of presumptively serious attacks, a
rather radical use of the data, a gap of less than 10% opens between
knife attacks considered presumptively serious and gun attacks con-
sidered presumptively serious.
The implications of these data on the basic question posed about
weapon dangerousness can best be set into perspective by taking the
most negative interpretation of the attack statistics and tracing its impli-
cations. If it is assumed that only those wounds inflicted by knives in
serious area locations that resulted in police reported punctures can be
presumptively considered attacks in earnest, but that every gunshot at-
tack reported is an attack in earnest or worse, the death rate per 100
[Vol. 35:721
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attacks in earnest by guns would still be two and one-half times that of
the death rate per 100 attacks in earnest by knives. Certainly, more rea-
sonable use of these data would involve a substantially smaller number
of asymmetrical assumptions. If the comparison is between knife punc-
ture wounds in serious areas and gun wounds in serious areas, guns ex-
hibit a death rate five times greater than knives.
Thus, when the data on the character of assaults are discussed in light
of assault rates by weapon in Chicago and death rates by weapon in
Chicago, a difference in attack intentions by weapon great enough to
explain the differential death rates experienced is highly unlikely.
CONCLUSION
The beginning of the present exercise is found in a crude but sugges-
tive set of ratios: the rate of homicide per 100 police reported attacks is
about five times as great for firearms as for knives, the next most danger-
ous weapon available in Chicago's homicide experience. Since a very
substantial part of Chicago's homicide rate appears to be attributable to
ambiguously motivated deadly attacks, it seems clear that the deadliness
of a particular weapon in an attack situation is a significant determinant
of the homicide rate. If this is true, then the killing per 100 attack ratio
cited above is a conclusive demonstration that the absence of firearms
would depress the otherwise expectable homicide rate, unless the dispro-
portionate number of killings per police reported attack could be ex-
plained by a plausible rival hypothesis.
We have sought an explanation which would comport with the reality
of homicide in Chicago and still explain the disproportionate killing
per attack ratios noted in official statistics. The biases built into the way
attacks are reported could only work to understate rather than overstate
the disproportionate dangerousness of firearm attacks. The remaining
rival hypothesis was then phrased in the form of the prediction that the
vast majority of all police reported knife attacks were non-earnest in na-
ture and all of the police reported gun attacks were of the kind that were
likely to produce ambiguously motivated homicides or worse. In fact, an
investigation of patterns of knife and gun wounding has suggested that
a roughly equal proportion of both knife and gun attacks appear to be
of a class likely to produce the ambiguously motivated homicide. The
negative conclusion available from these data has already been stated:
It is highly unlikely that the attack in earnest hypothesis which seeks to
differentiate knife and gun attacks could, in the light of our study of
wound location, completely explain the difference in kill ratios previ-
ously noted. But what of an affirmative conclusion?
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It might be thought that the five to one kill ratio relationship between
knives and guns, when combined with the apparent similarity of attack
in earnest ratios, could lead to a prediction that the absence of firearms
in Chicago's population would reduce Chicago's homicide experience
by four-fifths of the present gun-attributable total, or by some other
finite amount. Unfortunately, this is not the case. First, while a substan-
tial proportion of all homicides can be thought to be ambiguously mo-
tivated, we cannot make that assumption about all homicides, and we
cannot conclusively isolate the proportion of homicide experience which
is attributable to this kind of attack. Since the single-minded attack with
intent to kill surely results in death more often per 100 attacks than an
ambiguously motivated attack in earnest, we cannot confidently exclude
the number of single-minded killings which constitute a part of reported
homicides. However, there are some interesting data which might bear
on the proportion of single-minded killings. The proportion of multiple
woundings is only slightly higher in fatal gun attacks than in non-fatal,
serious gun attacks. Further, multiple wound figures in homicides for all
of 1967 account for only 30% of the gunshot killing totals. This would
tend to limit the number of "kill at any cost" cases which might exagger-
ate the impression of firearm dangerousness in the attack statistics.
Second, it is not unlikely that the apparent similarity between knife
and gun attack figures does conceal some disproportion between the
attack in earnest ratios noted in knife versus gun attacks. The only un-
likely conclusion is that weapon dangerousness does not affect the gross
expectable homicide rate. The precise extent of that effect is a matter
for conjecture. On their face, the data suggest that the effect of firearm
elimination would itself be quite substantial. But that phrase is a hedge,
and the method of this inquiry is non-experimental. The words "quite
substantial" are as far as the data will take us.
A final note should be taken of the initial assumption of this enter-
prise: that a degree of continuity exists between homicide and non-fatal
but serious assaults with deadly weapons. The similarities between se-
rious attacks reported by police and homicides are compelling. Both
events fall with disproportionate impact on the Negro community, and
upon a disproportionately high number of male victims. Since relation-
ship is a confirmed element of a great many such attacks, both phenom-
ena can be attributed to a similarly skewed group of attackers.9 The at-
tack data do not reveal substantial differences between fatal attacks using
particular weapon forms and serious area, non-fatal attacks involving
the same weapon. During the sample period:
9 See WOLFGANG, supra note 2, table 22, at 379; MURDER ANALYsL--1966, supra note 6.
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46% of the non-fatal knife attacks resulting in wounds to
serious areas, and 50% of the fatal knife attacks, involved mul-
tiple wounds.
16% of the non-fatal serious area firearm attacks, and 19% of
the fatal shootings, resulted in multiple wounds. (See Table 8.)
Perhaps these data are telling us it would be advisable to shift the
focus of concentration from the species of homicide to the genus of
deadly attack. The portion of the population subject to this threat
is as skewed as the homicide statistics indicate, but the problem
is larger. In the final years of this decade, a further study of this culture
of violence is an obligation to its survivors.
